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    A basic human good is the proper object of rational will ... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    A basic human good is the proper object of rational will because its desirability is self-evident to anyone sufficiently intelligent and mature to understand its goodness.

    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Will is intelligent response to intelligible good.
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    • 2.Basic human goods contribute to human flourishing and fulfillment.
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    • 3.Self-evident desirability makes each basic good the object of an inclination in the will of anyone who understands it.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Hume's is-ought gap shows that understanding a good's contribution to flourishing cannot by itself generate rational necessity of will toward it.
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    • 2.The move from 'this promotes human flourishing' to 'the will is thereby rationally bound to pursue it' smuggles in a normative premise not found in the descriptive understanding of the good.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Aristotle's account of akrasia demonstrates that agents can fully understand a good's desirability while failing to be moved by it, severing self-evidence from rational volition.
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    • 2.If self-evident goodness reliably produced rational willing, weakness of will would be conceptually impossible rather than a widely documented feature of human moral psychology.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics

    Connections

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    Truth & Knowledge1 linked

    Related

    Aristotle's account of akrasia demonstrates that agents can fully understand a g...Basic human goods contribute to human flourishing and fulfillment.Hume's is-ought gap shows that understanding a good's contribution to flourishin...If self-evident goodness reliably produced rational willing, weakness of will wo...
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    Self-evident desirability makes each basic good the object of an inclination in ...The move from 'this promotes human flourishing' to 'the will is thereby rational...Will is intelligent response to intelligible good.

    Similar

    Self-evident desirability makes each basic good the object of an incli...83%Our conception of practical rationality must fit within our overall co...82%Humans are rational creatures, so what is appropriate to humans includ...81%Standards of rationality should derive from standards for goodness of ...80%

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    SEP: aquinas-moral-political
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    Many modern accounts of Aquinas’ theory of natural law give explanatory primacy to the naturalness of the inclinations (to live, to know, etc.) that correspond to these basic goods. But others regard this as a fundamental misunderstanding of Aquinas’ conception of will, and of the epistemological relationship between nature and reason. Will is for him intelligent response to intelligible good: one’s will is “in” one’s reason [voluntas in ratione]. He makes it very explicit both that human action
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    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit