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It is not the case that A being can be functionally or modally divisible—admitting real internal distinctions—without being divisible into separable, independent substances.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
If distinctions are 'real,' they must ontologically ground somewhere; calling them merely 'functional' risks reducing them to appearance.
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2.
Modal divisibility (having distinct capacities) logically requires underlying compositional structure, implying some form of substrative division.
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3.
The claim conflates conceptual distinctions we draw with objective metaphysical divisions—the former doesn't establish the latter's reality.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Functional distinctions (like cognitive vs. emotional capacities) are empirically real yet don't require metaphysically separate substances.
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2.
Modal properties (what something can do) can differ within one entity; a mind can be divisible in powers without divisible in essence.
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3.
The Trinity doctrine exemplifies real distinctions in persons/functions within one divine substance, supporting coherence of this model.
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