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It is not the case that A claim about the basis for ascribing a meaning to a word or phrase may belong to metasemantics.
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Reasons For
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Reason for 1 of 2
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1.
Metasemantics concerns the extra-semantic facts that determine semantic facts, not claims about semantic facts themselves.
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2.
A claim about the basis for ascribing meaning is itself a semantic or meta-linguistic claim, not a fact that grounds semantic content.
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3.
Stalnaker's distinction reserves metasemantics for causal-historical or social facts, not propositional claims about ascription.
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Reason for 2 of 2
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1.
On Chomskyan internalist semantics, meaning ascription is grounded in I-language states, making such claims part of psychology, not metasemantics.
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2.
If the basis for ascribing meaning is cognitive or computational, the claim belongs to the theory of mind rather than to metasemantics.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
A claim about the basis for ascribing a meaning is a fact about semantics.
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2.
Metasemantics concerns facts about semantics.
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