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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that A criterial/causal distinction presupposes non-naturalism, which is a substantive metaethical commitment, not a neutral logical observation.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Logical distinctions (criterial vs. causal) are framework-independent tools applicable within naturalism or non-naturalism; they don't presuppose either.
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    • 2.Naturalists can distinguish criteria from causes while reducing both to natural facts—criteria are natural epistemic access points to natural causal processes.
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    • 3.Calling this observation 'substantive' begs the question; the burden is on the claimant to show the distinction *itself* (not its implications) requires non-naturalism.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Naturalism requires that all facts reduce to physical/causal facts. A criterial distinction (conceptual/definitional) cannot be reduced to causation.
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    • 2.Making a criterial/causal distinction implicitly claims some facts are non-causal, which contradicts naturalism's core commitment to causal exhaustiveness.
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    • 3.The claim appears neutral only if one smuggles in naturalist assumptions. Explicitly rejecting it requires defending non-causal ethical facts.
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