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It is not the case that A criterion that licenses mental state attribution to systems without intentionality conflates the intentional stance with genuine mental state possession.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Mental states may supervene on functional properties that don't require intrinsic intentionality; the distinction may be incoherent.
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2.
Without independent access to consciousness, any criterion distinguishing 'genuine' from 'attributed' mentality is epistemically circular.
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3.
Systems meeting functional/behavioral criteria for mental states may possess real intentionality; attributing it isn't necessarily stance-confusion.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
The intentional stance is a predictive tool, not an ontological claim about actual mental states or consciousness.
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2.
Systems without intrinsic intentionality (no aboutness independent of interpretation) lack the necessary conditions for genuine mentality.
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3.
Conflating useful explanatory frameworks with real phenomena undermines meaningful distinctions in philosophy of mind.
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