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    A disposition to be motivated by beliefs about reasons ca... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    A disposition to be motivated by beliefs about reasons cannot establish that a consideration R is itself a genuine reason for an agent to act.

    Moral ResponsibilityTruth & Knowledge
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Bernard Williams argued that genuine reasons must connect to an agent's subjective motivational set (SMS), not merely to beliefs about normative facts.
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    • 2.A disposition triggered by believing R is a reason operates independently of whether R actually figures in the agent's SMS.
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    • 3.Therefore, the dispositional mechanism bypasses the very internal grounding that Williams identifies as constitutive of genuine reasons.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Parfit's distinction between object-given and state-given reasons entails that genuine reasons are grounded in features of R itself, not in attitudes toward R.
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    • 2.A disposition to act on beliefs about reasons is itself a state-given motivation — it responds to the mental state of believing, not to R's object-level features.
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    • 3.A consideration that motivates only through a state-given route lacks the object-given grounding required for it to count as a genuine normative reason.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.A disposition to be motivated by beliefs about reasons can explain why a consideration R motivates an agent once he believes it is a reason to act.
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    • 2.For R to be a genuine reason for an agent to act, R itself must be a genuine explanation of the agent's acting.
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    • 3.A disposition triggered by the belief that R is a reason — rather than by R itself — means R is not the genuine explanation of the action.
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    Related

    A consideration that motivates only through a state-given route lacks the object...A disposition to act on beliefs about reasons is itself a state-given motivation...A disposition to be motivated by beliefs about reasons can explain why a conside...A disposition triggered by believing R is a reason operates independently of whe...
    +5 moreShow less
    A disposition triggered by the belief that R is a reason — rather than by R itse...Bernard Williams argued that genuine reasons must connect to an agent's subjecti...For R to be a genuine reason for an agent to act, R itself must be a genuine exp...Parfit's distinction between object-given and state-given reasons entails that g...Therefore, the dispositional mechanism bypasses the very internal grounding that...

    Similar

    A disposition to be motivated by beliefs about reasons can explain why...94%If a consideration cannot explain an agent's action, it cannot be a ge...88%While an agent must know or believe the thing that constitutes a reaso...87%A disposition triggered by the belief that R is a reason — rather than...86%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: reasons-internal-external
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    Hence, while many writers have come to the defense of external reasons by appealing to a disposition to be motivated by beliefs about reasons, if this interpretation is correct then Williams’ argument is directly aimed against this kind of solution. A disposition of this kind could explain why a consideration R could motivate an agent once he believed that it was a reason to act, but it could not make it the case that R itself was a genuine explanation of his acting, and therefore a reason for h
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit