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    A fetus is not a person and therefore cannot be identical... — Carmelics
    Home/Bioethics
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    Challenges→A fetus does not have a future like ours

    A fetus is not a person and therefore cannot be identical to any future person

    BioethicsPersonal Identity
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    BioethicsPersonal Identity

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    A fetus does not have a future like oursNone of the relations relevant to personal identity are present between a fetus ...To have a future like ours presupposes that one is identical to some person who ...

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    A fetus does not have a future like ours81%None of the relations relevant to personal identity are present betwee...79%If two persons are neither identical nor distinct, they cannot both st...78%A future being is the same person as a present person if that future b...78%

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    Turn now to just one way in which personal identity enters into the broader debate over abortion. Perhaps the most famous anti-abortion argument in the philosophical literature comes from Don Marquis, who argues that, because it is prima facie wrong to kill any entity with a future like ours, and because a fetus has a future like ours, it is prima facie wrong to kill a fetus (Marquis 1989). Peter McInerney and others, however, have denied that fetuses have futures like ours by appealing to

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