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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    A friendship between two equally virtuous individuals is ... — Carmelics
    Home/Virtue Ethics
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    A friendship between two equally virtuous individuals is perfect.

    Virtue Ethics
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Their friendship is based on mutual recognition of good character.
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    • 2.They are equal in virtue.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Perfect friendship requires not merely recognizing virtue in another, but actively cultivating and challenging it through sustained moral dialogue.
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    • 2.Two equally virtuous individuals lack the asymmetry necessary to provoke moral growth, rendering the relationship self-satisfied rather than perfective.
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    • 3.Aristotle's own account of eudaimonia as activity, not static possession, implies that friendships oriented toward shared moral striving surpass those resting on achieved parity.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Iris Murdoch argues that genuine moral attention requires perceiving the particular, irreducible otherness of another person beyond their classificatory virtues.
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    • 2.A friendship grounded primarily in mutual virtue-recognition risks collapsing into a mirroring relationship that obscures rather than reveals the other's particularity.
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    • 3.A friendship blind to particularity fails a necessary condition for the deepest form of love, undermining its claim to perfection.
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    Topics

    Virtue Ethics

    Related

    A friendship blind to particularity fails a necessary condition for the deepest ...A friendship grounded primarily in mutual virtue-recognition risks collapsing in...Aristotle's own account of eudaimonia as activity, not static possession, implie...Iris Murdoch argues that genuine moral attention requires perceiving the particu...
    +4 moreShow less
    Perfect friendship requires not merely recognizing virtue in another, but active...Their friendship is based on mutual recognition of good character.They are equal in virtue.Two equally virtuous individuals lack the asymmetry necessary to provoke moral g...

    Similar

    When two individuals recognize each other's good character and spend t...88%Recognition of good character in another, combined with shared virtuou...87%The friendship is grounded in the other person's good character.85%Their friendship is based on mutual recognition of good character.85%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: aristotle-ethics
    View source passageHide passage
    His taxonomy begins with the premise that there are three main reasons why one person might like someone else. (The verb, “philein”, which is cognate to the noun “philia”, can sometimes be translated “like” or even “love”—though in other cases philia involves very little in the way of feeling.) One might like someone because he is good, or because he is useful, or because he is pleasant. And so there are three bases for friendships, depending on which of these qualities binds friends together. W
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit