A functional role shared by a genuine representational state and a fictional posit cannot constitute a common ontological ground—functionalism cannot be neutral between these incompatible metaphysical commitments.

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Fictional posit(in metaphysics and philosophy of fiction): Something made up or imagined for the sake of explanation—like using a made-up character to illustrate a point.
Metaphysical commitments(in metaphysics): The fundamental beliefs you're taking on about what's real and how the world actually is when you adopt a certain position.
Ontological: "Ontological" refers to questions about what actually exists or is real. It's concerned with the fundamental nature of being—asking "What kinds of things are there?" rather than "How do we know about them?" For example, an ontological question might be whether numbers, ideas, or God actually exist as real things, or if they're just human inventions.
Representational state(in philosophy of mind): A real mental state (like a thought or belief) that stands for or points to something else in the world.
functional role

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