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Inverse View
It is not the case that A generalized account of rationality that permits systematically unreliable processes conflates pragmatic usefulness with epistemic justification.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Reliability itself can be understood pragmatically—what works reliably in context constitutes epistemic warrant.
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2.
Some systematically unreliable processes (e.g., heuristics) provide better overall epistemic outcomes than perfect methods.
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3.
The claim assumes a sharp boundary between justification and usefulness that natural cognition doesn't respect.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Epistemic justification requires truth-conduciveness; pragmatic usefulness can obtain without it.
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2.
Systematically unreliable processes generate false beliefs regularly, violating epistemic standards.
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3.
Conflating these standards undermines the distinction between knowledge and mere instrumental success.
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