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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that A God lacking middle knowledge would be less cognitively perfect than a Molinist God who knows all true conditionals, making ignorance of free choices a genuine omniscience deficit.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Counterfactuals about free choices may not be truth-bearers at all; their truth-value might be indeterminate, making omniscience coherent without knowing them.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Perfect knowledge of what must be true and what cannot be false suffices for omniscience; knowing impossible truths contradicts rather than perfects cognition.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Defining omniscience negatively—as absence of ignorance—conflates it with maximal belief; true omniscience may require freedom from determinist knowledge.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Knowledge of all true propositions is a necessary condition for cognitive perfection; middle knowledge expands the domain of knowable truths.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.A being that knows counterfactuals about free agents has greater explanatory power regarding creation's actual state than one without such knowledge.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Ignorance of any truth-bearing proposition constitutes a genuine epistemic limitation, even if that ignorance stems from the proposition's nature.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

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