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    A human being can mentally simulate what follows from hav... — Carmelics
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    Home/Consciousness & Mind
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    A human being can mentally simulate what follows from having another human being's mental states without resorting to theoretical knowledge about the mind's inner workings.

    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If a system S tries to simulate the state of a relevantly similar system S*, then S's simulation can be entirely process-driven: S simply runs in itself a process similar to the one S* underwent.
      ?

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    • 2.Human beings are, for all intents and purposes, relevantly similar to each other.
      ?

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    • 3.A human being simulating another human being need only reuse her own cognitive mechanisms to implement a simulation process.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Human beings differ systematically in their mental states due to culture, neurodiversity, and idiosyncratic history, undermining the 'relevant similarity' assumption.
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    • 2.When simulators adjust for known differences between self and target, they must invoke folk-psychological generalizations, reintroducing tacit theoretical knowledge.
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    • 3.Goldman's 'quarantine problem' shows simulators cannot reliably prevent their own actual beliefs from contaminating the pretend inputs fed into simulation.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Dennett's heterophenomenology argues that privileged introspective access to one's own mental states is itself theoretically laden and not a neutral starting point.
      ?

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    • 2.If introspection is already infected by folk-psychological theory, reusing one's own cognitive mechanisms as a simulation base covertly smuggles in theoretical knowledge.
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    Topics

    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge

    Key Terms

    knowledge(Distinguished from mere true belief, which may be the product of indoctrination and need not exercise deliberative capacities.)
    Justified true belief — true belief that has been arrived at through the exercise of deliberative capacities, including comparison of and deliberation among alternatives.

    Connections

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    Related

    A human being simulating another human being need only reuse her own cognitive m...Dennett's heterophenomenology argues that privileged introspective access to one...Goldman's 'quarantine problem' shows simulators cannot reliably prevent their ow...Human beings are, for all intents and purposes, relevantly similar to each other...
    +4 moreShow less
    Human beings differ systematically in their mental states due to culture, neurod...If a system S tries to simulate the state of a relevantly similar system S*, the...

    Similar

    A human being simulating another human being need only reuse her own c...87%Humans understand the mental states of others by using their own menta...86%Therefore, mental simulation events are not identical to mindreading e...81%Ascribing representational mental states to non-human agents provides ...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: folkpsych-simulation
    View source passageHide passage
    Heal (1986) and Goldman (1989) promptly replied to Dennett. Fair enough, if a system S tries to simulate the state of a radically different system Q (e.g., if a human being tries to simulate the state of a bridge), then S’s simulation must be guided by a theory. However, if a system S tries to simulate the state of a relevantly similar system S*, then S’s simulation can be entirely process-driven: to simulate the state which S* is in, S simply has to run in itself a process similar to the one S*
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    If introspection is already infected by folk-psychological theory, reusing one's...
    When simulators adjust for known differences between self and target, they must ...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit