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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    A judgment that merely follows a rule is only 'right,' no... — Carmelics
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    Home/Justice & Punishment
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    A judgment that merely follows a rule is only 'right,' not 'just'

    Justice & PunishmentPhilosophy of Language
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.For a decision to be just, a judge must not only follow a rule but also re-institute it in a new, unique judgment
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    • 2.Following a rule without re-institution is mere calculation and not genuine adjudication
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Rule-following is itself a normative practice requiring interpretive judgment, as Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations demonstrate.
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    • 2.The distinction between 'mere calculation' and 'genuine adjudication' collapses if every competent application of a rule already involves irreducible normative discretion.
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    • 3.If rule-application always involves such discretion, Derrida's 'just' decision cannot be distinguished structurally from what he dismisses as merely 'right'.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Lon Fuller and Ronald Dworkin argue that legal rules carry internal moral principles that a judge actualizes through faithful interpretation, not despite rule-following but through it.
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    • 2.If justice can be immanent within rules rather than transcendent to them, a judgment that faithfully applies a rule may simultaneously instantiate justice, not merely legality.
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    Topics

    Justice & PunishmentPhilosophy of Language

    Connections

    1 topic

    Moral Responsibility1 linked

    Related

    Following a rule without re-institution is mere calculation and not genuine adju...For a decision to be just, a judge must not only follow a rule but also re-insti...If justice can be immanent within rules rather than transcendent to them, a judg...If rule-application always involves such discretion, Derrida's 'just' decision c...
    +3 moreShow less
    Lon Fuller and Ronald Dworkin argue that legal rules carry internal moral princi...Rule-following is itself a normative practice requiring interpretive judgment, a...The distinction between 'mere calculation' and 'genuine adjudication' collapses ...

    Similar

    For a decision to be just, a judge must not only follow a rule but als...83%If a decision has not followed a rule, it is unjust78%If a decision has followed a rule with no foundation, it is again unju...77%A definition of justice that renders all these outcomes 'just' is mean...76%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: derrida
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    Derrida calls the first aporia, “the epoche of the rule” (Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, pp. 22–23). Our most common axiom in ethical or political thought is that to be just or unjust and to exercise justice, one must be free and responsible for one’s actions and decisions. Here Derrida in effect is asking: what is freedom. On the one hand, freedom consists in following a rule; but in the case of justice, we would say that a judgment that simply followed the law was only right, n
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit