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Inverse View
It is not the case that A kind defined solely by inductive success conflates epistemic convenience with ontological category membership.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
All access to ontology is mediated through inductive inference. The distinction between epistemic and ontological is unworkable here.
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2.
Natural kinds like 'species' are identified by convergent inductive success across domains, not by metaphysical essence.
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3.
Objects just are whatever stable patterns we reliably track. 'Convenience' and 'reality' collapse in a post-essentialist framework.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Inductive success measures predictive utility, not truth about what exists. Utility and ontology are distinct categories.
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2.
Multiple incompatible theories can be equally inductively successful. Ontological kinds should not be multiply realizable this way.
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3.
A kind's membership should depend on intrinsic properties, not observer convenience. Inductive success is observer-relative.
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