A kind earns realist status only when it sustains novel predictions; folk psychological kinds systematically fail this criterion, as Ramsey, Stich, and Garon argue regarding connectionist models (1991).

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Novel predictions(as used in philosophy of science): New, unexpected things that a theory forecasts about the world that haven't been tested before—the more a theory can predict correctly, the more real its ideas seem to be.
Ramsey, Stich, and Garon(as cited authorities in philosophy of mind): Three philosophers and cognitive scientists who wrote together in 1991 to argue that folk psychological terms (like 'belief' and 'desire') don't work the way we think they do and fail to make reliable predictions.
Realist status(as used in metaphysics and philosophy of mind): The quality of being considered a real, objective thing that exists independently—not just a useful way of talking about something.
connectionist models(cognitive science and artificial intelligence): Non-classical computational architectures (neural networks) that learn tasks by adjusting connection weights, starting from randomly chosen initial weights

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