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    A mental state counts as a representation only if it is c... — Carmelics
    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    Challenges→Emotions should not be considered representations

    A mental state counts as a representation only if it is consumed by other systems in light of what it says or indicates

    Consciousness & MindPhilosophy of Language
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    Philosophy of LanguageConsciousness & Mind

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    Emotions fail to play this larger explanatory role in the cognitive economy of t...Emotions should not be considered representations

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    The only way S can represent Q as having mental state M is by employin...82%The contents of mental states are not themselves mental states.82%Ascribing representational mental states to non-human agents provides ...81%We are justified in ascribing representational mental states to non-hu...81%

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    Another distinctive feature of enactivism is its anti-representational stance (Varela et al., 1991; Hutto & Myin 2013; Gallagher 2017). For example, Hutto (2012) has proposed that “we let go of the idea that emotions represent situations in truth-evaluable ways” (2012: 4), suggesting that emotions do not represent core relational themes. For instance, fear does not represent that there is danger at hand, and anger does not represent that there has been a slight against me or mine. Hutto’s (2

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