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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that A normative theory of adjudication derived from constitutional political economy must be structural, describing the structure of adjudication rather than dictating judicial motivation directly.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Lon Fuller's internal morality of law demonstrates that adjudication has inherent procedural obligations that constrain judges independently of institutional design.
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    • 2.If judges are bound by role-specific duties arising from law's internal logic, a normative theory can address judicial motivation directly rather than only structurally.
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    • 3.A purely structural theory that ignores intrinsic judicial obligations mischaracterizes adjudication as mere incentive-response behavior rather than a rule-governed practice.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Ronald Dworkin's account of adjudication holds that judges are morally obligated to interpret law as integrity, a motivational standard irreducible to institutional alignment.
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    • 2.The constitutional political economy assumption that judges invariably act self-interestedly is falsified by empirical judicial behavior studies showing deference to principle over interest.
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    • 3.If the self-interest premise is empirically contestable, the argument that motivation cannot be directly addressed collapses, leaving structural design as merely one normative option among several.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Constitutional political economy assumes political actors, including judges, will always act in a self-interested fashion within existing political institutions.
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    • 2.A normative theory cannot dictate directly judicial motivation if judges will always act self-interestedly regardless of such directives.
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    • 3.Adjudicative institutions can be designed to align the interests of judges with the interests of the constitution's designer.
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