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    A person can know that their beliefs are jointly inconsis... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→R. M. Sainsbury's definition of a paradox should be rejected

    A person can know that their beliefs are jointly inconsistent without this constituting a giant paradox

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    A definition of paradox that entails the negation of any belief is a paradox lea...R. M. Sainsbury's definition of a paradox should be rejectedUnder Sainsbury's definition, the negation of any belief would count as a parado...

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    A person with jointly inconsistent beliefs can take the negation of an...82%Kyburg tolerates joint inconsistency across a set of beliefs.81%The negation of any of a person's beliefs counts as a paradox under Sa...78%Because so many mutually incompatible belief systems can each appear c...76%

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    If you know that your beliefs are jointly inconsistent but deny this makes for a giant paradox, then you should reject R. M. Sainsbury’s definition of a paradox as “an apparently unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises” (1995, 1). Take the negation of any of your beliefs as a conclusion and your remaining beliefs as the premises. You should judge this jumble argument as valid, and as having premises that you accept, and yet as having

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