A possibilism grounded in contingently existing but modally rich possibilia is coherent if one accepts a deflationary truthmaker theory where modal truths require only their truth conditions, not existing grounds.
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(used to describe how we determine whether a thought accurately represents reality)
The specific circumstances or facts that would make a statement true or false—what has to be the case for a thought to be correct.
coherent(de Finetti's usage in the context of the Dutch Book argument for probabilism)
A subject is coherent if their unconditional degrees of belief do not permit a Dutch Book (a guaranteed loss through a combination of bets) to be made against them
modal(in logic and metaphysics)
Dealing with possibility and necessity—questions about what could be true, what must be true, and what's merely contingent (could go either way).
possibilia(The ontological commitments that actualists seek to avoid)
Merely possible individuals — entities that exist in some possible world but not in the actual world
possibilism(Contrasted with actualism; evaluates obligations based on what the agent could do, not what the agent will do.)
The view that an agent's obligations are determined by the best act-set possible for the agent across the relevant time span, regardless of what the agent will actually do.
truthmaker(Armstrong's truthmaker argument)
Something in the world which makes a given truth the case and serves as its ontological ground