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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    A promise to share poaching proceeds is not credible with... — Carmelics
    Home/Justice & Punishment
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    A promise to share poaching proceeds is not credible without a commitment device, because the promiser has no incentive to honor the promise once the antelope is secured.

    Justice & PunishmentSocial Contract
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Once the promiser has the antelope loaded onto the truck, the promiser gains nothing by sharing proceeds.
      ?

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    • 2.The flusher cannot report the breach of promise to police without incriminating themselves.
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    • 3.Rational agents defect when defection is dominant and unenforceable.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Repeated interaction and reputation effects transform one-shot defection calculations: Axelrod's tournaments show cooperation emerges without external enforcement.
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    • 2.Criminal networks sustain cooperation through social norms, shared identity, and reputational sanctions that substitute for legal commitment devices.
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    • 3.Hobbes himself acknowledged that covenants can be rational pre-performance when parties share ongoing social relations beyond the single transaction.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Gauthier's constrained maximization thesis holds that rational agents who are transparent deliberators gain by genuinely committing to honor agreements, making the promise credible ex ante.
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    • 2.An agent known to reliably honor extra-legal agreements commands future partnerships unavailable to defectors, making honoring the promise instrumentally rational even without third-party enforcement.
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    Topics

    Justice & PunishmentSocial Contract

    Connections

    2 topics

    Consequentialism2 linkedMoral Responsibility2 linked

    Related

    An agent known to reliably honor extra-legal agreements commands future partners...Criminal networks sustain cooperation through social norms, shared identity, and...Gauthier's constrained maximization thesis holds that rational agents who are tr...Hobbes himself acknowledged that covenants can be rational pre-performance when ...
    +4 moreShow less
    Once the promiser has the antelope loaded onto the truck, the promiser gains not...Rational agents defect when defection is dominant and unenforceable.Repeated interaction and reputation effects transform one-shot defection calcula...

    Similar

    Breaking a promise is tantamount to deceiving those to whom the promis...77%A commitment device that makes defection costly can transform a non-cr...75%A promise is only a bona fide promise if the practice of promising tha...74%A promise cannot exist if the promisee refuses to accept it71%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: game-theory
    View source passageHide passage
    Another example will illustrate this, as well as the applicability of principles across game-types. Here we will build an imaginary situation that is not a PD—since only one player has an incentive to defect—but which is a social dilemma insofar as its NE in the absence of commitment is Pareto-inferior to an outcome that is achievable with a commitment device. Suppose that two of us wish to poach a rare antelope from a national park in order to sell the trophy. One of us must flush the animal do
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    The flusher cannot report the breach of promise to police without incriminating ...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit