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    A rationality standard must be responsive to complexity-t... — Carmelics
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    Supports→A minimally rational agent need only make some of the valid inferences that follow from the agent's beliefs, not all of them.

    A rationality standard must be responsive to complexity-theoretic results about the difficulty of deductive inference.

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    A minimally rational agent need only make some of the valid inferences that foll...Requiring all valid inferences to be drawn is computationally intractable.

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    \(\neg K_i \phi \rightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi\), which expresses that \(i\)’s failure to know \(\phi\) entails that he knows of this failure – are considered more controversial. , Hintikka 1962; Lenzen 1978; Fagin et al. 1995) is that the most defensible choices of logics of knowledge lie between the modal systems \(\textsf{S4}\) and \(\textsf{S5}\). [56] Note, however, that both of these results seem prima facie implausible relative to our everyday understanding of knowledge. For on the one han

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