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    A reason that is 'sufficient in principle' but routinely ... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Positive retributivism holds that desert provides an in-principle sufficient reason for punishment, though only in principle.

    A reason that is 'sufficient in principle' but routinely overridden by costs is functionally indistinguishable from a prima facie reason, collapsing positive into negative retributivism.

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    Key Terms

    Negative retributivism(as used in philosophy of punishment)
    A form of retributivism focused on limiting punishment to only what is deserved, rather than actively requiring punishment as a moral duty.
    Positive retributivism(in criminal justice theory)
    The version of retributivism that says we are allowed to punish people who deserve it, or that we must punish them when they do.
    Retributivism(as used in ethics and justice philosophy)
    A theory of punishment that says people deserve to be punished in proportion to the harm they caused—the worse the crime, the harsher the punishment should be.
    prima facie reason(Used synonymously with pro tanto reason in characterizing the legal moralist principle)
    A reason that appears sufficient on first consideration but may be overridden by stronger competing reasons

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    sufficient in principle(as used in ethics and decision-making)
    A reason that would be strong enough to justify an action if nothing else mattered—but in real life, other factors (like costs or consequences) might prevent you from actually doing it.

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    Positive retributivism holds that desert provides an in-principle sufficient rea...

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