A reductive program either reduces everything physical/material to something mental (confirming idealism) or reduces everything mental to something physical/material (giving rise to realism or materialism)
A philosophy of mind under which the possibility of persons surviving death is considered
mental(Ryle (1949); used to deflect the objection that the identity theory eliminates the mental)
In ordinary usage, a grab-bag term covering heterogeneous phenomena such as mental arithmetic and mental illness, not a theoretically precise category that the identity theorist is committed to preserving
realism(Royce's characterization of the first historical conception of being)
The view that the world exists entirely independently of our thoughts or ideas about it — the world is what it is without any reference to our thoughts.
reductive program(Hegel's criticism of one-sided metaphysical reduction)
A philosophical program that either reduces everything physical/material to something mental (idealism) or reduces everything mental to something physical/material (realism or materialism)
Although Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) too embraces a dynamical conception of idealism in the spirit of Fichte and Schelling, he deviates from both of them by not relying on mental activities of some subject or other or on some primordial subjectless cognitive act as the most basic features of reality. He thus tries to transcend any traditional form of idealism. Given his deep distrust of irreconcilable dichotomies, of anything unmediated and one-sided, one cannot expect Hegel to be