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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that A resurrected person with the correct psychological connections to the deceased satisfies the dominant philosophical criteria for personal identity regardless of material gaps.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Psychological continuity alone allows multiple copies with equal claim to original identity, making the criterion incoherent for branching cases.
      ?

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    • 2.Material gaps imply causal discontinuity; without continuous physical process linking original to resurrection, the connection is merely similarity, not identity.
      ?

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    • 3.Dominant philosophical criteria (like Locke's) require direct causal chains; resurrection creates identity by fiat, not by satisfying actual continuity conditions.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Personal identity fundamentally depends on psychological continuity (memory, character, intentions), not physical substrate composition.
      ?

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    • 2.We already accept identity across physical change: same person at age 5 and 50 despite complete cellular replacement.
      ?

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    • 3.If psychological connections suffice for identity in normal cases, arbitrary material gaps shouldn't sever identity absent additional justification.
      ?

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