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Inverse View
It is not the case that A single entity can simultaneously instantiate distinct sortal kinds without contradiction, as Locke's same-day identity of a man and a person demonstrates.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
If man and person are genuinely distinct sortal kinds, they have different identity conditions and persistence criteria—making simultaneous instantiation incoherent.
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2.
Locke's argument conflates reference (same thing referred to) with predication (same properties). The terms can co-refer without instantiating distinct kinds.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Sortal kinds (man, person) classify by different criteria: man by biology, person by rational agency. Same entity can satisfy both.
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2.
Identity through time requires a single continuant. Multiple sortals describing the same continuant poses no logical contradiction.
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3.
We routinely apply distinct sortal classifications to single objects (e.g., 'statue' and 'clay'). This pluralism extends to persons.
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