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    A stronger, finer-grained notion of synonymy than L-equiv... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Identity of intension (L-equivalence) is insufficient as a criterion of synonymy for resolving the paradox of analysis

    A stronger, finer-grained notion of synonymy than L-equivalence is needed to make such distinctions

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    Addressing the paradox of analysis requires distinguishing expressions that are ...Identity of intension (L-equivalence) is insufficient as a criterion of synonymy...

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    The notion of synonymy cannot be given serious explanatory grounding85%Different theoretical purposes may demand different levels of granular...82%Each of those notions stands in as much need of explanation as synonym...82%The ordinary-language conception of synonymity conceals a range of exp...80%

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    Carnap (1946, 1947) worked out an intensional semantics for necessity and possibility operators for different example languages, and for the modal logic S5 that C.I. Lewis (1944) had previously discussed (see the supplement Semantics (Section 1) for the details). He also started exploring areas that are presently of special interest, such as “hyperintensional” semantics (see, e.g., Yablo 2014): In the context of addressing the paradox of analysis, he found that a stronger or finer-grained noti

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