Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    A substance, for Leibniz, must be a simple entity with no... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Personal Identity
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Challenges→Bucephalus is not a substance but a collection of simple substances

    A substance, for Leibniz, must be a simple entity with no parts

    Modality & PossibilityPersonal Identity
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    Personal IdentityModality & Possibility

    Related

    Bucephalus is a composite entity made up of multiple simpler componentsBucephalus is not a substance but a collection of simple substancesComposites are not themselves substances but are constituted by substances

    Similar

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Personal Identity
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Bucephalus is not a substance but a collection of simple substances86%Substances are simple, unextended entities that contain no parts83%Leibnizian substances do not have parts in the requisite sense.82%Form is substance82%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: continental-rationalism
    View source passageHide passage
    For Leibniz, at the most fundamental level, reality is characterized by simple substances, or “monads”, a term that Leibniz picked up from Francis Mercury van Helmont and Anne Conway in 1696 (Merchant 1979). Since there are composites, Leibniz argued, there must be simple substances that, together, constitute these composites. Being simple, monads have neither parts, nor extension, nor form, nor divisibility. Leibniz saw them as the “true Atoms of nature”. While Leibniz thus retained a strong co

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective