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Inverse View
It is not the case that A theory of analogical reasoning that conflates psychological modeling with logical justification commits a naturalistic fallacy about inference norms.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Naturalistic fallacies require illicit derivation of norms from facts; showing how minds *actually* analogize can inform justified norms.
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2.
Inference norms are partly constitutive of human rationality itself—what counts as 'correct' reasoning is grounded in our cognitive nature.
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3.
The distinction between psychological modeling and logical justification isn't always sharp; cognitive adequacy is evidence for normative validity.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Inference norms are prescriptive (how we should reason), while psychological models describe actual cognition (how we do reason).
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2.
Deriving 'ought' from 'is' without additional normative premises violates Hume's is-ought distinction and commits a naturalistic fallacy.
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3.
Analogical reasoning's validity depends on logical structure, not whether humans naturally deploy such reasoning patterns.
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