Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Abstract objects posited by Mīmāṃsā linguistic realism do... — Carmelics
    Home/Philosophy of Language
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Abstract objects posited by Mīmāṃsā linguistic realism do not really exist

    Philosophy of Language
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Benacerraf's epistemological challenge shows that if abstract objects lack causal power, we cannot have reliable knowledge of them.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Mīmāṃsā sphoṭa and universal-word entities (ākṛti) are posited precisely to ground linguistic knowledge, yet resist any epistemic access pathway.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A theory that requires entities inaccessible to any pramāṇa (valid epistemic instrument) violates Mīmāṃsā's own methodological commitment to verifiable sources of knowledge.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Quine's criterion of ontological commitment entails that entities are real only if quantification over them is indispensable to our best explanatory theories.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Nominalist programs (Goodman, Field) demonstrate that linguistic and mathematical practice can be reconstructed without positing abstract universals.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If abstract Mīmāṃsā entities like word-universals are eliminable from a complete semantic explanation, Occam's razor demands their rejection as genuine existents.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Real existence requires the capacity to interact causally with other particulars
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Abstract objects posited to make sense of language cannot have causal efficacy
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    1 topic

    Causation2 linked

    Related

    A theory that requires entities inaccessible to any pramāṇa (valid epistemic ins...Abstract objects posited to make sense of language cannot have causal efficacyBenacerraf's epistemological challenge shows that if abstract objects lack causa...If abstract Mīmāṃsā entities like word-universals are eliminable from a complete...
    +4 moreShow less
    Mīmāṃsā sphoṭa and universal-word entities (ākṛti) are posited precisely to grou...Nominalist programs (Goodman, Field) demonstrate that linguistic and mathematica...Quine's criterion of ontological commitment entails that entities are real only ...Real existence requires the capacity to interact causally with other particulars

    Similar

    Indeterminate ontological realism asserts the existence of objects ind...82%Modal realism entails that non-actual possible worlds exist, but mater...81%An object must exist at a world in order to exemplify properties at th...79%Abstract objects posited to make sense of language cannot have causal ...78%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: kumaarila
    View source passageHide passage
    Among Kumārila’s guiding intuitions here is the commonsensical thought that radical skepticism is not a tenable idea—that, in other words, it is to be presumed that we are, simply as a matter of empirical fact, already justified in believing a great deal, and that the task of epistemology is therefore to consider what must be the case in order for that to make sense. The thrust of Kumārila’s argument can be brought out by briefly contrasting this epistemological position with what Mīmāṃsakas not
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit