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    Accepting the existence of musical works requires accepti... — Carmelics
    Home/Aesthetics
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    Accepting the existence of musical works requires accepting a category of being distinct from both the 'real' and the 'ideal'.

    AestheticsModality & Possibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Musical works are not real objects (they cannot be identified with any particular physical sound event or score).
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    • 2.Musical works are not ideal objects (they are created, not discovered).
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    • 3.Every entity must belong to some ontological category.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Musical works are best understood as types, and types are abstract objects that can be both created and discovered, as Wolterstorff and Levinson argue.
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    • 2.If types are a species of abstract object, then the real/ideal distinction is sufficient to accommodate musical works without positing a third ontological category.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Nominalist accounts (e.g., Goodman's) reduce musical works to classes of compliant performances without remainder, eliminating the need for any sui generis ontological category.
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    • 2.If the logical structure of the supporting argument assumes that every musical work must be a single enduring entity, this begs the question against eliminativist and pluralist ontologies.
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    Topics

    AestheticsModality & Possibility

    Connections

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    Truth & Knowledge1 linked

    Related

    Every entity must belong to some ontological category.If the logical structure of the supporting argument assumes that every musical w...If types are a species of abstract object, then the real/ideal distinction is su...Musical works are best understood as types, and types are abstract objects that ...
    +4 moreShow less
    Musical works are not ideal objects (they are created, not discovered).Musical works are not real objects (they cannot be identified with any particula...Nominalist accounts (e.g., Goodman's) reduce musical works to classes of complia...The only remaining candidate category is that of purely intentional objects.

    Similar

    Traditional metaphysics classifies objects into two major categories: ...77%Works of literature cannot be classified under the category of the ide...77%Aesthetic and musical categories are more fundamental to metaphysics t...76%Musical works are not real objects (they cannot be identified with any...76%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: ingarden
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    The musical work, Ingarden argues, is distinct from experiences of its composer and listeners, and cannot be identified with any individual sound event, performance or copy of the score. But nor can it be classified among ideal entities, since it is created by a composer at a certain time, not merely discovered [Ontology, 4–5]. It thus apparently falls between categories such as the ‘real’ and the ‘ideal’, and so accepting the existence of musical works (like literary works) seems to require us
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit