- Adverbialists(as a school of thought in philosophy of mind)
- Philosophers who argue that when you experience something (like seeing red), you should describe it as 'sensing-redly' rather than saying there's an object called 'redness' that exists in your mind.
- Chisholm(as a philosopher being cited)
- Roderick Chisholm, an important 20th-century American philosopher who argued for essentialism (the view that things have properties they must have).
- Qualia-statements(as used in this discussion of perception)
- Sentences that describe what something feels like or how it appears to your senses—for example, 'this tastes sweet' or 'that looks red.'
- Sensing events(as the focus of adverbialist analysis)
- The actual act or moment when you perceive or feel something—like the moment you see a color or taste food.
- Structured objects(as something adverbialists avoid positing)
- Complex things made of parts that relate to each other—in this case, philosophers traditionally thought of experiences as composed of a mind plus separate mental 'objects' inside it.
- Tye(as a philosopher referenced)
- Michael Tye is a philosopher who developed theories about consciousness and how sensory experiences work; he's known for arguing that conscious experiences require the right kind of mental content.
- entailment account(The challenge is identifying the correct entailment relation.)
- A family of accounts of ontological commitment that ground commitment in entailment relations rather than in quantificational structure; different choices of entailment relation yield different specific accounts.
- qualia(The passage presents two competing definitions to contrast the views)
- On the Cartesian picture: intrinsic qualities of inner ideas of which subjects are directly aware, necessarily shared by internal duplicates regardless of environment. On wide representationalism: representational contents of inner states whose nature is partly externally determined