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    All agents other than God are only metaphorically agents — Carmelics
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    All agents other than God are only metaphorically agents

    Divine AttributesMoral Responsibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.All agents other than God both act and are acted upon
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    • 2.A true agent acts without being acted upon
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Aristotle's unmoved mover acts without being acted upon, yet Aquinas and others distinguish this from excluding all genuine secondary causation.
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    • 2.Aquinas's doctrine of instrumental causation holds that secondary causes genuinely produce effects proper to their nature, not merely metaphorically.
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    • 3.If metaphorical agency suffices for moral responsibility, then al-Kindi's framework cannot ground punishment or praise, undermining its own theological utility.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Al-Ghazali's occasionalism similarly denies genuine creaturely causation, yet critics like Ibn Rushd argued this collapses the intelligibility of natural science.
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    • 2.If 'being acted upon' disqualifies genuine agency, then God's reception of prayers and worship would paradoxically compromise divine agency under al-Kindi's own criterion.
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    Topics

    Divine AttributesMoral Responsibility

    Connections

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    Causation1 linked

    Related

    A true agent acts without being acted uponAl-Ghazali's occasionalism similarly denies genuine creaturely causation, yet cr...All agents other than God both act and are acted uponAquinas's doctrine of instrumental causation holds that secondary causes genuine...
    +3 moreShow less
    Aristotle's unmoved mover acts without being acted upon, yet Aquinas and others ...If 'being acted upon' disqualifies genuine agency, then God's reception of praye...If metaphorical agency suffices for moral responsibility, then al-Kindi's framew...

    Similar

    Created things are not truly agents83%All agents other than God both act and are acted upon82%Rational agents are objects of this self-constituting kind.81%Two purely altruistic agents can find themselves in a Prisoner's Dilem...77%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: al-kindi
    View source passageHide passage
    Al-Kindi goes on to explain that whereas God is a “true” agent, since He is a cause of being and acts without being acted upon, all other agents are only “metaphorically” agents, because they both act and are acted upon. The force of the term “metaphorical” here is the same as it was in On First Philosophy: just as created things are both many and one, and thus not “truly” one, so they are both passive and active, and thus not “truly” agents.
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit