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    All attempts to cross the is-ought gap are questionable — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Moral nihilism cannot be ruled out by arguments from non-moral facts, observations, or their best explanations

    All attempts to cross the is-ought gap are questionable

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    Moral nihilism cannot be ruled out by arguments from non-moral facts, observatio...Ruling out moral nihilism via non-moral premises requires crossing the is-ought ...

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    One cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is' (Hume's is-ought gap).87%Aquinas's ethics does not invalidly attempt to deduce 'ought' from 'is...78%An analysis of 'ought' that eliminates genuine contradiction between s...76%Ruling out moral nihilism via non-moral premises requires crossing the...73%

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    There are two main responses to such skeptical hypothesis arguments (cf. May 2013). First, some anti-skeptics deny (1) and claim that skeptical hypotheses can be ruled out somehow. They might argue that moral nihilism is internally inconsistent or meaningless. If so, it can be ruled out by logic and semantics alone. However, moral nihilism does seem consistent and meaningful, according to all plausible theories of moral language, including expressivism, realism, and constructivism (Sinnott-Arms

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