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    All other Aristotelian fallacies involve deductions that ... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Ignoratio elenchi is a distinct kind of fallacy from the other Aristotelian fallacies.

    All other Aristotelian fallacies involve deductions that are themselves bad.

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
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    Ignoratio elenchi is a distinct kind of fallacy from the other Aristotelian fall...In ignoratio elenchi, the deduction itself contains no logical error.The fallacy in ignoratio elenchi lies in the conclusion only appearing to contra...

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    Aristotle's fallacies are primarily a catalogue of bad deductions that...94%SDF defines fallacies in terms of deductive invalidity.83%What unifies Aristotle's fallacies is their dependence on the concepts...81%With one exception (ignoratio elenchi), each fallacy Aristotle identif...81%

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    Aristotle observed that “reasoning and refutation are sometimes real and sometimes not, but appear to be real owing to men’s inexperience; for the inexperienced are like those who view things from a distance” (SR, 1 164b25). The ideas here are first that there are arguments that appear to be better than they really are; and second that people inexperienced in arguments may mistake the appearance for the reality and thus be taken in by a bad argument or refutation. Apparent refutations are primar

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