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    All things of a given kind share the same nature in some ... — Carmelics
    Home/Personal Identity
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    Supports→Shared natures cannot explain the individuation of particular things

    All things of a given kind share the same nature in some sense

    Modality & PossibilityPersonal Identity
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    Personal IdentityModality & Possibility

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    A shared nature is common to multiple individuals and therefore cannot distingui...Shared natures cannot explain the individuation of particular things

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Relations of similarity between particulars must have a real foundatio...81%The properties shared by all and only the members of a natural kind ar...81%A relation can hold between two things of completely different natures80%If two things have different properties, they are not identical80%

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    SEP: medieval-haecceity
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    Given the huge problems that an account of haecceities seems to raise, it is worth seeing just why Scotus believes he needs to accept this view of individuation as opposed to a rival one. Scotus defends haecceities by rejecting all alternative theories of individuation known to him. Rejecting qualitative theories is easy for the scholastics. Suppose that all things of a given kind in some sense share the same nature. The nature as such cannot explain individuation. So the explanation must be som

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