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    Alston's work on epistemic circularity demonstrates that ... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Psillos's additional condition for valid rule-circular arguments is not clearly justified.

    Alston's work on epistemic circularity demonstrates that the normative force of a rule-circular argument cannot depend on the reasoner's psychological state of doubt.

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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Normative epistemic rules apply universally to rational agents regardless of their subjective doubt or confidence levels.
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    • 2.A rule's justificatory force derives from its logical structure and truth-conduciveness, not from the believer's psychological state.
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    • 3.If normativity depended on doubt, the same argument would be both justified and unjustified for different people—undermining objectivity.
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.Epistemic justification requires appropriate sensitivity to one's evidence; ignoring doubt about a rule's reliability seems epistemically irresponsible.
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    • 2.Rule-circular arguments depend on antecedent acceptance of the rule, which doubt rationally undermines—creating genuine defeaters for justification.
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    • 3.Alston's position may conflate normative force with defeasibility: a rule can be normatively binding yet its application defeated by reasonable doubt.
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    Related

    A rule's justificatory force derives from its logical structure and truth-conduc...Alston's position may conflate normative force with defeasibility: a rule can be...Epistemic justification requires appropriate sensitivity to one's evidence; igno...If normativity depended on doubt, the same argument would be both justified and ...
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    Normative epistemic rules apply universally to rational agents regardless of the...Psillos's additional condition for valid rule-circular arguments is not clearly ...Rule-circular arguments depend on antecedent acceptance of the rule, which doubt...

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