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    An absolutely nothing state — the complete absence of all... — Carmelics
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    Home/Natural Theology
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    An absolutely nothing state — the complete absence of all reality — is not conceptually coherent.

    Modality & Possibility
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.One can imagine the nonexistence of particular things or classes of things at the empirical level.
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    • 2.The ability to imagine successive removals of particular things does not entail that the process can be extended infinitely to reach a state of absolutely nothing.
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    • 3.Not every verbally possible statement is conceptually coherent, even under a generous notion of 'conceptual'.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Wittgenstein's tractarian logical space and Heidegger's 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' both treat absolute nothingness as a coherent limiting concept.
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    • 2.The conceptual coherence of a limiting case does not require that the limit be achievable or instantiable, only that it be consistently defined.
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    • 3.If absolute nothingness functions as a meaningful boundary concept in modal reasoning, denying its coherence arbitrarily forecloses legitimate metaphysical inquiry.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.David Lewis's modal realism holds that conceivability without contradiction is a defeasible guide to possibility, and 'no concrete entities exist' appears contradiction-free.
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    • 2.Argument P4 smuggles in a substantive metaphysical commitment — that generic existence is necessary — as a premise rather than deriving it, making the argument question-begging.
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    • 3.The inference from 'empirical removals cannot be completed stepwise' to 'absolute nothingness is incoherent' commits a compositional fallacy about infinite procedures.
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    Topics

    Natural TheologyModality & Possibility

    Connections

    2 topics

    Philosophy of Language1 linkedSkepticism1 linked

    Related

    Argument P4 smuggles in a substantive metaphysical commitment — that generic exi...At the generic, metaphysical level only positive instances are possible — someth...David Lewis's modal realism holds that conceivability without contradiction is a...If absolute nothingness functions as a meaningful boundary concept in modal reas...
    +6 moreShow less
    Not every verbally possible statement is conceptually coherent, even under a gen...One can imagine the nonexistence of particular things or classes of things at th...The ability to imagine successive removals of particular things does not entail ...

    Similar

    A state of absolutely nothing is not conceptually possible, because at...84%The sheer absence of all reality cannot conceivably be experienced.83%To radically think absolute nothingness, it must not be reified into a...82%Suppose nothing exists. Then no actual states of affairs exist.82%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: hartshorne
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    Hartshorne’s Platonic or Bergsonian argument against creation ex nihilo, in simplified form, looks something like this: one can in fact imagine the nonexistence of this or that, or even of this or that class of things, a fact that gives some the confidence to (erroneously) think that this process can go on infinitely such that one could imagine a state in which there was “absolutely nothing.” However, not every verbally possible statement is made conceptually cogent by even the most generous not
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    The conceptual coherence of a limiting case does not require that the limit be a...
    The inference from 'empirical removals cannot be completed stepwise' to 'absolut...
    Wittgenstein's tractarian logical space and Heidegger's 'Why is there something ...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit