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Inverse View
It is not the case that An agent's epistemic limitations can themselves be morally culpable, so 'reason to believe' cannot fully discharge the agent's objective moral responsibility.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Holding agents responsible for epistemic limitations conflates what they can control (inquiry efforts) with what they cannot (cognitive capacity).
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2.
Objective moral responsibility requires the agent possessed actual or accessible reasons; epistemic gaps are precisely where neither exists.
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3.
Blaming someone for not knowing something creates infinite regress: they'd need prior knowledge of what they should have investigated.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Agents can culpably fail to acquire evidence through negligence, inattention, or willful ignorance before acting.
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2.
Moral responsibility requires reasonable diligence in belief-formation, not merely good-faith reasoning from available evidence.
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3.
If epistemic negligence is itself blameworthy, then subjective justification cannot fully excuse objective wrongdoing.
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