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    An argument is non-transmissive when the subject's doubt ... — Carmelics
    Home/Skepticism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    An argument is non-transmissive when the subject's doubt about the conclusion rationally requires the subject to adopt new background assumptions on which the premises are no longer justified by the relevant evidence

    Truth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.If a subject doubts (or suppositionally doubts) an argument's conclusion, this doubt can rationally require revising background assumptions
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    • 2.When revised background assumptions undermine the justification of the premises, the argument cannot transmit epistemic warrant to the conclusion
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Epistemic justification is a function of the evidence available at the time of belief formation, not of subsequent suppositional revisions.
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    • 2.A subject's hypothetical doubt about a conclusion cannot retroactively alter the evidential relations that originally justified the premises.
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    • 3.Therefore, transmission failure requires a structural defect in the argument itself, not a contingent psychological or suppositional state of the subject.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.On a Moorean dogmatist view (Pryor 2000), perceptual justification for premises is immediate and not conditioned on the antecedent refutation of skeptical hypotheses.
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    • 2.If immediate justification is genuine, doubt about a conclusion that merely invokes skeptical possibilities cannot rationally compel revision of that foundational justification.
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    • 3.The claim therefore conflates rational coherence constraints on belief revision with the prior question of whether warrant was transmitted at all.
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    Topics

    SkepticismTruth & Knowledge

    Key Terms

    Conclusion(Output of an Argument; may be singular (C) or plural (C1, C2, etc.))
    A logically interconnected result produced by an Argument within a Deduction
    Evidence(Distinguished from prior/intrinsic probability in the context of the low priors argument)
    Factors extrinsic to a hypothesis that raise or lower its probability
    Justified (in epistemology)(as used in the theory of knowledge)
    When a belief is supported by good reasons or evidence—you have legitimate grounds to think it's true.
    Premise
    A premise is a statement or fact that you assume to be true as a starting point for reasoning or making an argument. Think of it as the foundation or building block you use to reach a conclusion—for example, "All dogs are animals" and "My pet is a dog" are premises that lead to the conclusion "My pet is an animal." Premises are essentially the evidence or claims you offer before drawing a final conclusion.
    Rationally requires(in logic and philosophy)
    Logically demands or necessitates based on reason—if you accept something as true, then reason says you must accept what follows from it.
    Transmissive (in epistemology)(as used in the theory of knowledge)
    The idea that if you have good reasons to believe something, and those reasons logically lead to a conclusion, then you automatically have good reasons to believe that conclusion too.
    argument(Epistemology and argumentation theory; the 'evidentiary' conception of argument)
    An evidentiary construct consisting of (1) premises, (2) a conclusion, and (3) an inference from the premises to the conclusion, implying that the conclusion is true, likely true, plausible, or should otherwise be accepted.
    background assumptions(Davies 2003a, p. 43)
    Assumptions an externalist must hold in order to rationally grant that the *premises are warranted, which already imply the conclusion (3)
    non-transmissive(Applied to Zebra* and the disjunctive template)
    A structure or template is non-transmissive of first-time justification when conditions for acquiring first-time justification for a conclusion cannot all be satisfied when that structure is instantiated.

    Related

    A subject's hypothetical doubt about a conclusion cannot retroactively alter the...Epistemic justification is a function of the evidence available at the time of b...If a subject doubts (or suppositionally doubts) an argument's conclusion, this d...If immediate justification is genuine, doubt about a conclusion that merely invo...
    +4 moreShow less
    On a Moorean dogmatist view (Pryor 2000), perceptual justification for premises ...The claim therefore conflates rational coherence constraints on belief revision ...

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: transmission-justification-warrant
    View source passageHide passage
    In spite of these considerations, a few authors (e.g., Davies 1998, and 2003a, 2004, and 2009, McLaughlin 2000 and Wright 2002, 2003, and 2007) have insisted that we should conceive of epistemic transmissivity in a way that proves very closely related or even identical to the capability of resolving doubt. Whereas some of these authors have eventually conceded that epistemic transmissivity cannot be defined as capability of resolving doubt (e.g., Wright 2011), others have attempted to articulate
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Therefore, transmission failure requires a structural defect in the argument its...
    When revised background assumptions undermine the justification of the premises,...

    Similar

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    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit