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    An individual a has property P accidentally — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    An individual a has property P accidentally

    Modality & Possibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Individual a is a member of P
      ?

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    • 2.There exists some other-worldly counterpart b of a such that b is not a member of P
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Counterpart relations are not identity relations, so b's lacking P tells us nothing about whether a itself could lack P.
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    • 2.Accidental property ascription requires de re modality about a, not qualitative similarity facts about distinct individuals in other worlds.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.On Kripkean essentialism, properties grounded in natural kind membership or origin are necessary, not accidental, regardless of counterpart variation.
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    • 2.The existence of a world-bound counterpart lacking P may reflect modal variation in the counterpart relation itself, not genuine contingency in a's possession of P.
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    Modality & Possibility

    Related

    Accidental property ascription requires de re modality about a, not qualitative ...Counterpart relations are not identity relations, so b's lacking P tells us noth...Individual a is a member of POn Kripkean essentialism, properties grounded in natural kind membership or orig...
    +2 moreShow less
    The existence of a world-bound counterpart lacking P may reflect modal variation...There exists some other-worldly counterpart b of a such that b is not a member o...

    Similar

    An individual a has property P essentially87%An individual a has a property P just in case a is a member of P85%No property can be more specific than itself76%If a property belongs to every P, it belongs to any P75%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: possible-worlds
    View source passageHide passage
    Thus, on this analysis, a proposition p is true in a world w just in case w ∈ p and an individual a has a property P just in case a ∈ P. (Note that propositions are thus simply properties of worlds on these definitions.) a has P accidentally just in case a ∈ P but b ∉ P for some other-worldly counterpart of b of a; and a has P essentially if b ∈ P for every counterpart b of a.
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit