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    An intellectual form is a species. — Carmelics
    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    Supports→The human soul is immaterial.

    An intellectual form is a species.

    Philosophy of Language
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    Philosophy of LanguageConsciousness & Mind

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    2 topics

    Natural Theology2 linkedPersonal Identity

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    Species are immaterial.The human soul is immaterial.The soul is the intellectual form of the living thing.

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    A species (mental representation) as a third mediating thing is not ne...81%If a species is a thing in itself that stands in for the object in the...80%The resulting intelligible species acts on the possible intellect, mov...80%This conflates the notion of species (a 'secondary substance' in the C...78%

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    SEP: al-kindi
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    That There are Incorporeal Substances (Abu Rida 1950, 265–69, Adamson and Pormann 2009) is a creative application of ideas from Aristotle’s Categories to the problem of showing that the human soul is an immaterial substance. Al-Kindi takes up this task in stages, first proving that the soul is a substance, then showing that it is immaterial. He argues that the soul is a substance by drawing on the opening chapters of the Categories to claim that the essence of something shares a name and definit

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