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    'Animal' is predicated of 'human being' in virtue of the ... — Carmelics
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    Supports→The proposition 'homo est animal' would still be true even if no human being actually existed outside the soul.

    'Animal' is predicated of 'human being' in virtue of the common nature.

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Predications of common nature do not require actual individual existence to be t...The proposition 'homo est animal' would still be true even if no human being act...

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    The actual existence of things outside the soul is not always required for a (affirmative) proposition (here understood as a statement-making sentence) to be true (NLP II.7, 381). Nonbeing can be understood as being not yet actual but in potency only, that is, that has an aptitude to exist in actuality.[24] About those things that can but do not yet exist outside the soul, existence is taken to refer to the (common) nature and not to the individual (NLP II.7, 379): when animal is predicated of

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