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    Anti-platonists cannot claim that 'that'-clauses refer to... — Carmelics
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    Anti-platonists cannot claim that 'that'-clauses refer to sentence types.

    Philosophy of Language
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Sentence types are abstract objects
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    • 2.Anti-platonists reject abstract objects.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Sentence types can be construed nominalistically as equivalence classes of physical token inscriptions, requiring no platonic commitment.
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    • 2.Hartry Field's fictionalism and Geoffrey Hellman's modal structuralism show anti-platonists can accept type-talk via paraphrase strategies.
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    • 3.If 'that'-clauses refer to sentence types reconceived nominalistically, the anti-platonist incurs no ontological debt to abstract objects.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.The inference from 'sentence types are abstract objects' to 'anti-platonists cannot use sentence types' commits the fallacy of begging the question against nominalist reductions.
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    • 2.Wilfrid Sellars and later Lynne Rudder Baker argue sentence types can be grounded in linguistic practices and dispositions without positing mind-independent abstracta.
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    Philosophy of Language

    Connections

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    Modality & Possibility2 linked

    Related

    Anti-platonists reject abstract objects.Hartry Field's fictionalism and Geoffrey Hellman's modal structuralism show anti...If 'that'-clauses refer to sentence types reconceived nominalistically, the anti...Sentence types are abstract objects.
    +3 moreShow less
    Sentence types can be construed nominalistically as equivalence classes of physi...The inference from 'sentence types are abstract objects' to 'anti-platonists can...Wilfrid Sellars and later Lynne Rudder Baker argue sentence types can be grounde...

    Similar

    Anti-platonists cannot claim that 'that'-clauses refer to types, becau...94%An anti-platonist view of 'that'-clauses and belief reports cannot hol...92%An anti-platonist view must deny that the referents of 'that'-clauses ...86%Therefore the two 'that'-clauses cannot both refer to the same externa...86%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: platonism
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    Now as it's formulated here, this argument doesn't rule out the view that ‘that’-clauses refer to mentalese sentence types, but the argument can be extended to rule out that view as well (e.g., one might do this by talking not of an American and a Russian but of two creatures with different internal languages of thought). I won't run through the details of this here, since, as we've seen, anti-platonists can't claim that ‘that’-clauses refer to types anyway, because types are abstract objects. B
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit