Any causal-memory criterion must distinguish genuine memory from quasi-memory (Parfit's notion) by appeal to same-person causation, making the criterion ineliminably self-referential.
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A memory-like experience that feels like a real memory but wasn't actually caused by your own past experience—for example, remembering events from someone else's life as if they were yours.
Same-person causation(in philosophy of personal identity)
The idea that one person's past self caused changes in their current self—essentially, the causal connection that links you across time as one continuous person.
Self-referential(as used in logic)
When a statement refers to itself rather than to something external; like a sentence that talks about its own truth or falsehood.
genuine memory(Personal identity theory — memory criterion)
A memory state that accurately represents a past experience the rememberer actually had; distinguished from merely seeming to remember.