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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Any explanation of consciousness that proceeds from physical or neural premises requires bridge principles connecting physical/neural facts with facts about consciousness

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Russellian monism, advanced by Chalmers and Strawson, holds that phenomenal properties constitute the intrinsic categorical bases of physical dispositional properties.
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    • 2.If consciousness is among the intrinsic grounds of the physical, then physical descriptions already implicitly quantify over phenomenal facts, dissolving the logical gap the argument presupposes.
      ?

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    • 3.The argument's P2 assumes a completed, self-standing physical ontology, but structural-causal physics leaves intrinsic natures open — an assumption Bertrand Russell's 1927 Analysis of Matter explicitly challenged.
      ?

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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Type identity theory holds that mental state types are identical to brain state types, making bridge principles redundant rather than explanatorily necessary.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If 'pain' just is 'C-fiber firing,' no connective principle bridges them — they name the same fact, as Place and Smart argued against Nagel's explanatory gap.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.As a matter of logic, one needs bridge principles to connect propositions about consciousness with propositions that do not mention consciousness
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Physical or neural facts do not inherently mention consciousness
      ?

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