Any ontological distinction between rest and motion that lacks causal-mechanical consequence cannot do explanatory work in a physics that derives collision outcomes from the quantity of motion transferred.

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Causal-mechanical consequence(as used in physics and philosophy of science): A real, physical effect that follows from something—like how pushing a ball causes it to move. If something has causal-mechanical consequence, it actually makes a measurable difference in the physical world.
Collision outcomes(as used in physics): What happens when two objects crash into each other—like the direction and speed they move afterward.
Explanatory work(what a theory accomplishes in helping us understand the world): The job that something does in explaining or accounting for why things are the way they are—the actual work of making sense of phenomena.
Ontological: "Ontological" refers to questions about what actually exists or is real. It's concerned with the fundamental nature of being—asking "What kinds of things are there?" rather than "How do we know about them?" For example, an ontological question might be whether numbers, ideas, or God actually exist as real things, or if they're just human inventions.

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