Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Any revised Russellian theory would have to distinguish b... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Philosophy of Language
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Any revised Russellian theory would have to distinguish between different uses of 'good', giving one account for asserted contexts and a different account for unasserted contexts

    Philosophy of Language
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Frege's embedding problem shows that moral terms in conditionals like 'If X is good, we should do X' cannot carry illocutionary force.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Geach's argument demonstrates that 'good' in unasserted contexts must have descriptive content stable enough to permit logical inference.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.An optative analysis that only triggers in assertion contexts cannot preserve logical validity across embedded and unembedded occurrences of the same term.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Blackburn's quasi-realist program explicitly acknowledges that expressivist accounts require supplementary logic for embedded moral clauses.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.The need for such supplementary logic in quasi-realism confirms that asserted and unasserted moral contexts demand structurally distinct semantic treatments.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Russell's original theory only accounts for asserted uses of 'X is good'
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.A revised theory would need to explain how 'X is good' is meaningful in unasserted contexts
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Explaining unasserted contexts requires a different semantic account than the optative analysis used for asserted contexts
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Philosophy of Language

    Related

    A revised theory would need to explain how 'X is good' is meaningful in unassert...An optative analysis that only triggers in assertion contexts cannot preserve lo...Blackburn's quasi-realist program explicitly acknowledges that expressivist acco...Explaining unasserted contexts requires a different semantic account than the op...
    +4 moreShow less
    Frege's embedding problem shows that moral terms in conditionals like 'If X is g...Geach's argument demonstrates that 'good' in unasserted contexts must have descr...Russell's original theory only accounts for asserted uses of 'X is good'The need for such supplementary logic in quasi-realism confirms that asserted an...

    Similar

    A revised theory would need to explain how 'X is good' is meaningful i...89%Any theory that explains 'good' as an optative in unasserted contexts ...87%If 'good' functions as an optative in unasserted contexts (e.g., premi...84%Russell's original theory only accounts for asserted uses of 'X is goo...82%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: russell-moral
    View source passageHide passage
    The person who accepts this argument clearly does not wish that everyone should always desire to contemplate beautiful works of art. But she subscribes to premise (2) nonetheless. Thus the sentence “it is always good to contemplate beautiful works of art”, cannot generally be construed as an optative when it occurs in an embedded context (that is when it occurs as a sub-sentence within a larger, more complex sentence). This is already a very damaging objection to Russell’s theory of how “good” f
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit