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    Appearances and things in themselves have different modal... — Carmelics
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    Home/Perception
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    Supports→Appearances and things in themselves are distinct

    Appearances and things in themselves have different modal properties

    Modality & PossibilityPerception
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    PerceptionModality & Possibility

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    Personal Identity1 linked

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Appearances and things in themselves are distinctEntities with different modal properties cannot be identical

    Similar

    If two things differ in their modal properties, they are not identical...91%Entities with different modal properties cannot be identical85%A modal distinction obtains between a thing and an intrinsic mode of t...83%Sensible qualities and objects, considered as modes of the mind, are m...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: kant-transcendental-idealism
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    This argument purports to show that, since appearances and things in themselves have different modal properties, they must be distinct. Since (P1) and (P2) are claims Kant makes in the context of his theoretical philosophy, this argument provides warrant for denying identity on purely theoretical grounds.

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