Armstrong's immanent universals can be wholly present at multiple spatially discontinuous locations simultaneously, a feature incompatible with the region-identity central to supersubstantivalism.
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The idea that something can only be identified with or located in one specific place or region of space.
spatially discontinuous locations(The statement asks whether the same property can exist in completely separated places at once)
Different places that are completely separated from each other—imagine two objects on opposite sides of the room that aren't connected.
supersubstantivalism(Used to argue for the restricted version of No Interpenetration)
The view under which material objects are identified with or essentially tied to spatial regions, such that disjoint material objects cannot share exact locations
wholly present(Described as the implicit rationale behind ordinary concepts of objects, contrasted with the perdurantist view that objects have temporal parts.)
An object is wholly present at a time if the entire object, not merely a temporal stage or part of it, exists at that time.