Armstrong's partial identity account requires determinate universals to be mereological sums of unit universals, but this commits to a highly contentious structural realism about quantities.
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Armstrong's theory that determinates are partially identical to (or partially the same as) their determinable—they share some features but aren't completely the same thing.
Quantities(the specific type of properties being discussed in relation to structural realism)
Measurable properties like length, weight, temperature, or brightness—anything that can be described using numbers.
Unit universals(the fundamental parts that compose larger universals)
The simplest, most basic universal properties that cannot be broken down into smaller properties—think of them as the building blocks of all other properties.
structural realism(Philosophy of science; the position all three critics are attacking)
The view that our best scientific theories give us knowledge of the structure of the world but not of its intrinsic nature or content, typically motivated by the problem of theory change